By Swann Collins, investor, writer and consultant in international affairs – Eurasia Business News, April 1st, 2026. Article no. 2076
Why the World Is Becoming More Dangerous — Structural Causes
For three decades after 1991, much of the strategic community assumed that major war among great powers had become improbable. The Cold War had ended without nuclear exchange. The United States emerged as the sole superpower. Globalization accelerated. Institutions expanded. The European Union deepened. China integrated into the world economy after joining the WTO in 2001.
Yet as of the mid-2020s, global conflict risk is measurably rising. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered the European security order. Strategic competition between the United States and China intensified across the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The Middle East witnessed renewed regional escalation cycles. Military budgets surged worldwide — reaching over $2.4 trillion globally in 2023 (SIPRI, 2024). Nuclear modernization programs accelerated in all major nuclear powers.
The outbreak of a new war involving Iran in March 2026 further underscores this trend. Triggered by escalating confrontations between Iran and regional adversaries—particularly Israel—and involving indirect U.S. military engagement, the conflict has rapidly expanded beyond proxy dynamics into direct interstate confrontation. Strikes on strategic infrastructure, maritime disruptions in the Persian Gulf, and heightened risks around the Strait of Hormuz have introduced significant volatility into global energy markets. More importantly, the conflict illustrates how regional rivalries are increasingly embedded within broader great-power competition, with external actors providing diplomatic, logistical, or military support. The Middle East, long characterized by proxy warfare, is thus re-emerging as a theater of direct strategic confrontation with global implications.
Why is this happening?
The answer is structural. The international system is moving from unipolarity toward unstable multipolarity, while hegemonic stability is eroding. This systemic transition — long predicted by structural realist theory — historically correlates with rising probability of great-power confrontation.
This is not about personalities. It is about distribution of power.
I. From Unipolar Moment to Multipolar Tension
In 1990, U.S. GDP represented roughly 25% of global output. Its military spending exceeded that of the next ten countries combined. NATO expanded eastward in Europe in 1999 and 2004. The dollar dominated global reserves (over 70% in 2000). No peer competitor existed.
Charles Krauthammer famously called this period the “Unipolar Moment” (Foreign Affairs, 1990). Structural realists debated how long it would last.
According to Kenneth Waltz (Theory of International Politics, 1979), international systems are defined by polarity — the number of great powers capable of shaping outcomes. Waltz argued that bipolar systems (like the Cold War) tend to be more stable because fewer actors reduce miscalculation. Multipolar systems, by contrast, increase uncertainty, alliance fluidity, and misperception.
From 1947 to 1991, the U.S.–Soviet bipolar structure produced intense rivalry but avoided direct great-power war. After 1991, the system became unipolar — historically rare. Unipolarity often tempts the dominant power to expand its commitments, while rising powers accumulate grievances.
By the 2010s, the structural distribution of power shifted. China’s GDP (PPP) surpassed that of the United States around 2014 (IMF estimates). Russia reasserted military capacity, demonstrated in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022). India’s economic weight increased dramatically. Regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia pursued autonomous strategies.
The system began tilting toward multipolarity.
Waltz predicted that balancing behavior would eventually emerge against a unipolar hegemon. That balancing is now visible — not only militarily but financially, technologically, and diplomatically.
II. John Mearsheimer and the Logic of Offensive Realism
If Waltz explains systemic structure, John Mearsheimer explains behavior within it.
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer argued that great powers are compelled to maximize relative power because the international system lacks central authority. Security competition is not optional; it is built into anarchy. States must be ready to strike first when danger lurks.
From this perspective, China’s rise inevitably generates U.S. containment efforts. A rising China will seek regional hegemony in Asia, just as the United States achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century (Monroe Doctrine, 1823 ; War in 1898 against Spain over Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines). The United States, in turn, will attempt to prevent peer dominance in Eurasia. They already try to block Russia from regaining control over Ukraine after 1991, and support Ukraine in its wish to be independent and join the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic space.
This dynamic produces structural tension independent of ideology.
The U.S.–China rivalry fits Mearsheimer’s model almost precisely:
- Trade integration (2001–2016) did not eliminate security competition.
- Military modernization accelerated on both sides.
- The U.S. “Pivot to Asia” (2011) reoriented force posture.
- China expanded naval capabilities, artificial island construction (2014–2016), and anti-access/area-denial systems.
- Taiwan became a focal flashpoint.
Mearsheimer warned in 2014 that great-power politics would return to Europe as NATO expanded eastward while Russia weakened and resented encroachment. The Ukraine war validated his broader structural claim: security dilemmas escalate when powers fear encirclement.
The tragedy lies not in malice, but in structural compulsion.
War in the Middle East since March 2026
The war involving Iran illustrates the integration of economic pressure with military escalation. Financial sanctions, payment system exclusion, and export controls by the U.S. and its allies now operate as components of a broader strategic toolkit. On the other side, Iran closed the Straits of Hormuz and has targeted the oil tankers trying to navigate through it, provoking an oil price crisis worldwide.
III. Declining Hegemonic Stability
The post-1945 international order rested on a specific structural condition: the preponderance of American power. The United States did not merely participate in the system—it organized it. The theory of hegemonic stability, articulated by Charles Kindleberger in The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (1973) and later refined by Robert Gilpin in War and Change in World Politics (1981), posits that international order depends on the presence of a dominant state willing and able to supply collective goods. These goods include an open trading system, a stable monetary framework, and security guarantees that reduce uncertainty among other states.
After 1945, the United States fulfilled these functions with unprecedented scope. Through the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—it stabilized the global financial system. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1947, progressively reduced trade barriers. The creation of NATO in 1949 institutionalized American security commitments in Europe, while bilateral alliances extended U.S. influence across Asia. The U.S. Navy ensured freedom of navigation along critical sea lanes, facilitating the expansion of global commerce. Simultaneously, containment of the Soviet Union structured the geopolitical order, creating a stable bipolar equilibrium.
This system persisted, with adaptations, after the Cold War. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States entered what Charles Krauthammer termed the “unipolar moment.” American primacy appeared uncontested. The dollar accounted for over 70% of global reserves in the early 2000s. NATO expanded eastward in 1999 and 2004. The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, incorporated China in 2001, accelerating globalization.
After 1945, the United States:
- Anchored the Bretton Woods system.
- Created NATO (1949).
- Established the dollar as reserve currency.
- Secured sea lanes.
- Contained Soviet expansion.
After 1991, American primacy continued, but cracks emerged:
- Relative Economic Decline
The U.S. share of global GDP gradually declined as Asia rose. - Costly Overextension
Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001–2021) drained political and financial capital. - Domestic Polarization
Internal fragmentation weakened strategic coherence. - Weaponization of Interdependence
Sanctions regimes expanded dramatically after 2014 and especially 2022, encouraging targeted states to build alternatives.
Yet hegemonic stability is not static. It depends on the continued capacity and willingness of the hegemon to sustain systemic leadership. By the 2010s, structural pressures began to erode this foundation.
When hegemony weakens, revisionist powers test boundaries.
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IV. The BRICS Factor and Systemic Realignment
The rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa; later expansion) symbolizes institutional balancing.
While BRICS is not a military alliance, it represents strategic dissatisfaction with Western institutional dominance. The creation of the New Development Bank (2014) and discussions of de-dollarization signal attempts to diversify systemic dependence.
Paul Jouvenet’s geopolitical analysis of BRICS argues that the bloc functions as a platform for coordinated strategic autonomy rather than ideological unity. It aims at reducing the Western leverage on the international stage by increasing alternative financing channels and diplomatic alignment among non-Western powers.
By 2030, the BRICS+ could together account for 40% of global GDP and about 45% of the population, with 3.5 billion people.
This is structural balancing in slow motion.
Multipolarity does not emerge solely through tanks and missiles. It emerges through:
- Payment systems.
- Energy trade diversification.
- Technology supply chain realignment.
- Institutional alternatives.
When financial architecture fragments, conflict probability increases because economic interdependence no longer constrains security escalation as strongly.
V. Why Multipolarity Is More Dangerous
Kenneth Waltz argued bipolar systems are stable because they generate :
- Fewer miscalculations.
- Clear alliance structures.
- Direct deterrence logic.
On the other side, multipolar systems (pre-1914 Europe) contain:
- Fluid alliances.
- Chain-ganging risks.
- Buck-passing behavior.
- Misperception cascades.
The pre-World War I order provides a cautionary analogy. Britain’s relative decline, Germany’s rise, Russian mobilization, alliance entanglements — structural instability culminated in 1914.
Today’s system shows comparable traits:
- U.S.–China rivalry.
- Russia–West confrontation.
- Regional nuclear actors (India–Pakistan).
- Middle Eastern proxy conflicts.
- Technological arms race in AI and cyber.
More poles mean more potential dyadic crises and more instability on the world stage.
VI. Nuclear Deterrence Is Not Enough
The proposition that nuclear weapons prevent great-power war has long structured strategic thinking. Since 1945, and particularly during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence contributed to the avoidance of direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD), formalized in the 1960s and analyzed by Thomas Schelling (Arms and Influence, 1966) and Bernard Brodie, imposed a ceiling on escalation. Crises such as Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962) demonstrated that, despite acute tensions, the existence of second-strike capabilities constrained decision-makers.
However, this stabilizing effect was contingent upon a specific structural configuration: bipolarity. Two principal actors, relatively symmetrical arsenals, and increasingly institutionalized arms control frameworks — including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, 1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), and later START I (1991) — reduced uncertainty and created a degree of predictability in strategic interaction.
The contemporary nuclear environment differs fundamentally. The system has evolved toward a multipolar nuclear configuration, characterized by a greater number of actors, asymmetrical capabilities, and the erosion of arms control regimes. This transformation introduces new pathways for miscalculation.
As of 2024, all major nuclear powers engaged in comprehensive modernization programs. Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons and intend to modernize their arsenals. The United States pursued the renewal of its triad — Columbia-class submarines, B-21 strategic bombers, and Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) systems. Russia advanced hypersonic delivery systems such as Avangard and Kinzhal, while maintaining a large arsenal estimated at approximately 5,800 warheads (SIPRI, 2024). China, historically a minimal deterrent power, accelerated its nuclear expansion. U.S. Department of Defense reports estimated that Beijing possessed more than 500 operational warheads in 2023, with projections exceeding 1,000 by 2030 (SIPRI, 2024 and 2025).
Simultaneously, regional nuclear dyads intensified their capabilities. India and Pakistan continued to expand fissile material production and diversify delivery systems, including sea-based deterrents. North Korea demonstrated rapid progress in missile technology, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) tested in 2017 and subsequent refinements through the early 2020s. Israel maintained strategic ambiguity while preserving credible deterrent capabilities.
This diversification of nuclear actors complicated deterrence logic. In a bipolar system, signaling and red lines were relatively clear. In a multipolar system, deterrence becomes fragmented and non-linear. Each dyadic relationship — U.S.–China, India–Pakistan, U.S.–Russia, China–India — operates according to distinct doctrines, threat perceptions, and escalation thresholds. Cross-theater interactions further increase complexity: a crisis in the Taiwan Strait may affect calculations in Eastern Europe or the Korean Peninsula.
Moreover, the erosion of arms control frameworks exacerbated instability. The U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the uncertain future of New START reduced transparency. As Robert Jervis argued, uncertainty in adversary capabilities and intentions heightens the risk of worst-case scenario planning, thereby accelerating arms races.
Technological developments introduced additional risks. Hypersonic weapons reduced warning times. Cyber capabilities threatened command-and-control systems. The integration of artificial intelligence into early-warning architectures raised concerns about automation bias and escalation through system error. As noted by scholars such as Vipin Narang (MIT) and Tong Zhao (Carnegie), these innovations compress decision timelines and increase the probability of inadvertent escalation.
Thus, while nuclear deterrence continues to impose a powerful constraint on deliberate large-scale war, it no longer guarantees systemic stability. The multiplication of actors, the asymmetry of capabilities, the decline of arms control, and the emergence of disruptive technologies collectively narrow the margins of safety.
Deterrence persists — but it operates in a more opaque, less predictable environment. The risk is no longer solely intentional escalation; it increasingly lies in misperception, miscalculation, and systemic complexity.
VII. The Security Dilemma Intensifies
The concept of the security dilemma, formalized by Robert Jervis in his seminal 1978 article “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” described a structural condition in which measures adopted by a state to increase its own security were perceived by others as threatening, thereby triggering countermeasures that ultimately reduced the security of all. This dynamic, already present during the Cold War, intensified significantly under contemporary multipolar conditions.
In a bipolar system, signaling remained comparatively clearer. The United States and the Soviet Union developed mechanisms — including arms control agreements, hotlines, and crisis management protocols — that mitigated misinterpretation. In contrast, a multipolar environment multiplied the number of actors, threat perceptions, and strategic cultures, thereby increasing ambiguity and the likelihood of misperception.
The post-Cold War expansion of NATO illustrated this mechanism. From the perspective of the United States and its European allies, enlargement in 1999 and 2004 aimed to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe by extending a security umbrella to post-communist states. However, Russian strategic thought — articulated by figures such as Yevgeny Primakov and later reflected in official doctrines (notably the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation) — interpreted this expansion as a gradual encirclement. This divergence in perception contributed directly to heightened tensions, culminating in the crises of 2014 and 2022.
A similar dynamic unfolded in the Indo-Pacific. China’s naval modernization, including the rapid expansion of its surface fleet and the development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, was framed in Beijing as a defensive effort to secure maritime approaches and protect sea lines of communication. Yet, in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, these developments were widely interpreted as indicative of expansionist intent, particularly in light of activities in the South China Sea between 2014 and 2016.
Missile defense further exemplified the dilemma. The United States presented its ballistic missile defense systems as protective measures against rogue-state threats, notably Iran and North Korea. However, Russia and China perceived these systems as potentially undermining second-strike capabilities, thereby destabilizing nuclear deterrence. This perception contributed to the development of countermeasures, including hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced penetration aids.
The cumulative effect of these interactions was a self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust. Defensive doctrines generated offensive interpretations; these interpretations justified countermeasures; countermeasures, in turn, reinforced initial fears. As Charles Glaser and other realist scholars have emphasized, even in the absence of aggressive intent, structural conditions can produce competitive outcomes.
In the current international system, characterized by technological acceleration, doctrinal opacity, and weakened arms control frameworks, the security dilemma operates with increased intensity. Mutual suspicion no longer remains confined to military domains but extends to cyber infrastructure, supply chains, and financial systems. The result is a generalized securitization of international relations, in which cooperation becomes more difficult and escalation risks grow correspondingly.
VIII. Economic Fragmentation and Strategic Autonomy
For much of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, globalization was widely understood as a stabilizing force. Deep economic interdependence increased the opportunity cost of conflict, reinforcing what liberal theorists—from Norman Angell in The Great Illusion (1910) to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in Power and Interdependence (1977)—described as the pacifying effects of trade and financial integration. The underlying assumption was straightforward: states embedded in dense networks of commerce would be less inclined to escalate geopolitical tensions into open conflict.
This assumption is now under strain.
Since the mid-2010s—and with clear acceleration after 2020—the global economy has entered a phase of selective fragmentation. This process does not represent a full reversal of globalization, but rather its strategic reconfiguration along geopolitical lines. States are not abandoning interdependence; they are reshaping it to reduce vulnerability and increase autonomy.
Several structural developments illustrate this shift.
First, the imposition of U.S. semiconductor export controls on China beginning in 2018 and significantly expanded in October 2022 marked a decisive turning point. These measures restricted China’s access to advanced chips, manufacturing equipment, and technical expertise. As Chris Miller argues in Chip War (2022), semiconductors are the “oil of the digital age,” making control over their production a central strategic objective. The United States, in coordination with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, effectively leveraged chokepoints in the global supply chain to constrain China’s technological development.
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China’s response has been equally significant. Massive state investment in domestic semiconductor capacity—through funds exceeding $100 billion—reflects a long-term strategy of technological self-reliance. This dynamic exemplifies what economists describe as “decoupling under pressure”: restrictions imposed by one side accelerate autonomy efforts by the other.
Second, supply-chain restructuring has become a defining feature of corporate and state strategy. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global production networks, particularly in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and critical minerals. Governments responded by promoting reshoring, nearshoring, and “friend-shoring.” The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act (2022) and the European Chips Act (2023) explicitly aim to localize production of critical technologies.
This shift reflects a broader redefinition of efficiency. For decades, firms optimized for cost minimization through global dispersion of production. Today, resilience and security are increasingly prioritized, even at the expense of higher costs. As the OECD has noted in recent reports (2023–2025), supply chains are becoming shorter, more regional, and more politically conditioned.
Third, energy markets have undergone profound realignment following the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Europe, historically dependent on Russian pipeline gas, rapidly diversified toward liquefied natural gas (LNG), particularly from the United States and Qatar. Russia, in turn, redirected energy exports toward China and India, often at discounted prices.
This reconfiguration illustrates how geopolitical shocks can permanently alter trade flows. Energy, long considered a global commodity market, is increasingly shaped by political alignment. Contracts, infrastructure, and pricing mechanisms now reflect strategic considerations as much as market dynamics.
The cumulative effect of these developments is the gradual emergence of strategic autonomy as a central objective of state policy. The European Union has explicitly adopted this concept in areas ranging from digital regulation to defense industrial policy. China’s “dual circulation” strategy similarly seeks to reduce external dependence while maintaining selective global engagement. The United States, while historically a champion of open markets, has increasingly embraced industrial policy and export controls as instruments of national security.
This transformation has significant implications for deterrence and conflict dynamics.
When economic interdependence is high, the costs of confrontation are immediate and widely distributed. Trade disruption, capital flight, and supply-chain breakdown impose rapid economic penalties on all parties involved. This creates what might be termed deterrent friction—a structural constraint on escalation.
However, as interdependence weakens or becomes more segmented, these constraints diminish. States that have diversified supply chains, localized production, or secured alternative markets are better positioned to absorb shocks. The perceived cost of confrontation declines, even if the absolute cost remains high.
Historical analogies reinforce this point. In the late nineteenth century, rising economic interdependence did not prevent the outbreak of World War I in 1914. As historians such as Christopher Clark (The Sleepwalkers, 2012) have shown, political and strategic calculations ultimately overrode economic and cultural considerations. The current period may reflect a similar dynamic: interdependence persists, but it is no longer sufficient to guarantee restraint of great powers.
Moreover, fragmentation introduces new forms of competition. Instead of a single global market, multiple partially overlapping systems are emerging:
- A U.S.-centered financial and technological network ;
- A China-centered industrial and trade ecosystem ;
- A heterogeneous Global South navigating between them ;
- Structuring economic and energy ties between Russia and China.
This multipolar economic structure increases complexity and reduces predictability. Firms must navigate divergent regulatory regimes, sanctions risks, and political pressures. Investors face greater uncertainty regarding long-term returns, particularly in sectors exposed to geopolitical competition.
From a strategic perspective, economic fragmentation does not eliminate interdependence—it redistributes it. Dependencies become more asymmetric, more politicized, and more contested. This, in turn, creates incentives for states to exploit economic leverage, whether through sanctions, export controls, or resource access.
The result is a paradox: globalization has not disappeared, but its stabilizing effects have weakened. Economic ties remain extensive, yet they are increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations.
In this environment, strategic autonomy becomes both a defensive necessity and a source of competitive advantage. States that successfully reduce critical dependencies—whether in energy, technology, or finance—enhance their freedom of action. Conversely, those that remain structurally dependent face heightened vulnerability.
Ultimately, the erosion of economic interdependence as a constraint on conflict represents one of the most significant structural shifts of the twenty-first century. It does not make conflict inevitable. But it reduces one of the key mechanisms that previously helped prevent it.
For analysts, policymakers, and investors alike, the implication is clear: economic structures can no longer be treated as neutral or purely efficiency-driven. They are increasingly embedded within geopolitical competition.
And as deterrent friction declines, the margin for miscalculation narrows.
IX. Why the System Is More Volatile Now Than in 1991
To understand why global risk feels qualitatively higher today, one must compare structural conditions.
In 1991, the international system displayed four stabilizing characteristics.
First, there was one dominant pole. The United States emerged from the Cold War with unmatched military, financial, technological, and ideological power. Its defense spending dwarfed any competitor. Its navy controlled global sea lanes. Its alliances spanned Europe and Asia. There was no near-peer competitor.
Second, potential challengers were weak. Russia experienced economic collapse throughout the 1990s, losing nearly 40% of its GDP between 1991 and 1998. China’s GDP was still a fraction of the U.S. economy; its military capabilities were regionally limited. India remained economically constrained. The European Union was deepening integration rather than projecting hard power.
Third, the liberal institutional order expanded. NATO enlarged in 1999 and 2004. The European Union expanded eastward. The World Trade Organization was established in 1995. China entered the WTO in 2001. Global trade as a percentage of world GDP increased significantly between 1990 and 2008. Interdependence created expectations of convergence.
Fourth, the system inherited nuclear bipolar stability. Although the Soviet Union dissolved, the nuclear logic of mutually assured destruction remained intact between Washington and Moscow. Arms control treaties such as START I (1991) and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum reinforced deterrence predictability. Nuclear risk existed, but the number of strategic decision centers remained limited.
By contrast, the mid-2020s system differs structurally in every dimension.
There are now multiple major powers with comparable capabilities. China has reached near parity with the United States in economic scale when measured by purchasing power parity. Its military modernization has been rapid, particularly in naval and missile forces. Russia, though economically weaker, demonstrated willingness to revise borders by force in 2008, 2014, and 2022. India’s economy is among the fastest-growing major economies and is translating demographic weight into geopolitical leverage.
Second, regional nuclear rivalries have intensified. India–Pakistan deterrence remains fragile. North Korea continues expanding its missile capabilities. China is increasing its nuclear arsenal, complicating the formerly bilateral U.S.–Russia strategic framework. Nuclear deterrence is no longer structured around a stable dyad.
Third, hegemonic authority has eroded. The United States remains the strongest actor but faces internal polarization and external resistance. Sanctions regimes have proliferated, but their effectiveness depends on broad compliance — which is weakening. The credibility of security guarantees is increasingly tested, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
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Fourth, financial system fragmentation is emerging. While the dollar remains dominant, discussions of alternative settlement mechanisms have increased. Energy trade patterns shifted dramatically after 2022. Strategic commodities are being securitized. Economic interdependence is no longer assumed to be permanent or benign.
Fifth, the system is witnessing a technological arms race across artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, space systems, and hypersonic weapons. Unlike previous arms competitions confined largely to military platforms, today’s competition spans civilian infrastructure, supply chains, and digital ecosystems. This expands the domain of contestation.
The cumulative result is clear: volatility is rising not because the world has become more ideological, but because power is redistributing across more actors simultaneously.
X. The Dangerous Decade Ahead
Power transition theory, articulated by A.F.K. Organski in 1958, argues that systemic war becomes most likely when a rising power approaches parity with the dominant state. Dissatisfaction combined with capability creates risk.
China is now approaching parity with the United States in economic magnitude, though not yet in global force projection capacity. The United States, for its part, seeks to maintain strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific while preserving alliance credibility in Europe and the Middle East. Russia, weakened economically but assertive militarily, seeks to revise European security arrangements. India rises but strategically hedges, maintaining relations with both Western and non-Western blocs.
This configuration produces transition instability. It resembles earlier historical moments when structural shifts outpaced institutional adaptation.
The 1890s saw Germany’s rapid industrial rise challenge British naval dominance. The 1930s witnessed revisionist powers exploit economic depression and institutional weakness. In both cases, the established order struggled to integrate rising actors while maintaining deterrence credibility.
The 2020s display similar characteristics: accelerating economic shifts, contested norms, military modernization, and declining institutional cohesion. Transition periods are not inevitably catastrophic — but they are structurally dangerous.
The coming decade will test whether great powers can manage rivalry without escalation. Taiwan, the Baltic region, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula represent potential flashpoints where local crises could entangle major powers.
XI. What Would Stabilize the System?
Historically, three configurations have produced relative stability.
First, clear bipolarity, as during the Cold War, simplified deterrence logic and alliance structures. Two poles reduced uncertainty and clarified red lines.
Second, hegemonic consolidation, as after 1945, allowed a dominant power to provide public goods and enforce systemic rules.
Third, institutionalized multipolar governance, such as the Concert of Europe (1815–1853), enabled great powers to coordinate crisis management despite ideological differences.
None of these conditions are fully present today.
The system is not clearly bipolar; it is not securely unipolar; and it lacks a cohesive multipolar concert. Elite trust among major powers is low. Normative fragmentation is high. Strategic communication channels exist but are strained.
A stable multipolar concert would require shared crisis-management mechanisms, predictable red lines, and elite consensus on basic order principles. Yet ideological divergence and domestic political polarization complicate such consensus-building.
The absence of a stabilizing structure increases systemic unpredictability.
XII. Conclusion: Structure, Not Accident
Global conflict risk is rising because the architecture of power is shifting.
Unipolarity is ending. Multipolarity is emerging. Hegemonic stability is weakening. Balancing behavior is accelerating. Economic fragmentation reduces constraints. Nuclear deterrence is becoming more complex in a multi-actor environment.
None of this guarantees global war. Structural tension does not equal inevitability.
However, history suggests that periods of power redistribution carry elevated risk. The late nineteenth century, the interwar period, and the early Cold War all reflected transitional instability.
The contemporary system is undergoing comparable structural transformation. Leaders operate within this evolving architecture. Their decisions matter — but they are constrained by systemic incentives.
The world is becoming more dangerous not primarily because leaders are irrational, but because the distribution of power is changing faster than institutions can adapt.
Structural transitions rarely unfold quietly. The next decade will determine whether this transition is managed — or whether instability intensifies into open confrontation.
Selected References
- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979)
- John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
- Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (1973)
- Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981)
- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” (1978)
- Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules (2012)
- Paul Jouvenet, analyses on BRICS and multipolar order (2022 and 2023)
- SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2024)
- IMF World Economic Outlook (various years)
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© Copyright 2026 – Eurasia Business News. Article no. 2075
Eurasia Business News, April 1st, 2026. Article no. 2076
Why the World Is Becoming More Dangerous — Structural Causes
For three decades after 1991, much of the strategic community assumed that major war among great powers had become improbable. The Cold War had ended without nuclear exchange. The United States emerged as the sole superpower. Globalization accelerated. Institutions expanded. The European Union deepened. China integrated into the world economy after joining the WTO in 2001.
Yet as of the mid-2020s, global conflict risk is measurably rising. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered the European security order. Strategic competition between the United States and China intensified across the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The Middle East witnessed renewed regional escalation cycles. Military budgets surged worldwide — reaching over $2.4 trillion globally in 2023 (SIPRI, 2024). Nuclear modernization programs accelerated in all major nuclear powers.
The outbreak of a new war involving Iran in March 2026 further underscores this trend. Triggered by escalating confrontations between Iran and regional adversaries—particularly Israel—and involving indirect U.S. military engagement, the conflict has rapidly expanded beyond proxy dynamics into direct interstate confrontation. Strikes on strategic infrastructure, maritime disruptions in the Persian Gulf, and heightened risks around the Strait of Hormuz have introduced significant volatility into global energy markets. More importantly, the conflict illustrates how regional rivalries are increasingly embedded within broader great-power competition, with external actors providing diplomatic, logistical, or military support. The Middle East, long characterized by proxy warfare, is thus re-emerging as a theater of direct strategic confrontation with global implications.
Why is this happening?
The answer is structural. The international system is moving from unipolarity toward unstable multipolarity, while hegemonic stability is eroding. This systemic transition — long predicted by structural realist theory — historically correlates with rising probability of great-power confrontation.
This is not about personalities. It is about distribution of power.
I. From Unipolar Moment to Multipolar Tension
In 1990, U.S. GDP represented roughly 25% of global output. Its military spending exceeded that of the next ten countries combined. NATO expanded eastward in Europe in 1999 and 2004. The dollar dominated global reserves (over 70% in 2000). No peer competitor existed.
Charles Krauthammer famously called this period the “Unipolar Moment” (Foreign Affairs, 1990). Structural realists debated how long it would last.
According to Kenneth Waltz (Theory of International Politics, 1979), international systems are defined by polarity — the number of great powers capable of shaping outcomes. Waltz argued that bipolar systems (like the Cold War) tend to be more stable because fewer actors reduce miscalculation. Multipolar systems, by contrast, increase uncertainty, alliance fluidity, and misperception.
From 1947 to 1991, the U.S.–Soviet bipolar structure produced intense rivalry but avoided direct great-power war. After 1991, the system became unipolar — historically rare. Unipolarity often tempts the dominant power to expand its commitments, while rising powers accumulate grievances.
By the 2010s, the structural distribution of power shifted. China’s GDP (PPP) surpassed that of the United States around 2014 (IMF estimates). Russia reasserted military capacity, demonstrated in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022). India’s economic weight increased dramatically. Regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia pursued autonomous strategies.
The system began tilting toward multipolarity.
Waltz predicted that balancing behavior would eventually emerge against a unipolar hegemon. That balancing is now visible — not only militarily but financially, technologically, and diplomatically.
II. John Mearsheimer and the Logic of Offensive Realism
If Waltz explains systemic structure, John Mearsheimer explains behavior within it.
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer argued that great powers are compelled to maximize relative power because the international system lacks central authority. Security competition is not optional; it is built into anarchy. States must be ready to strike first when danger lurks.
From this perspective, China’s rise inevitably generates U.S. containment efforts. A rising China will seek regional hegemony in Asia, just as the United States achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century (Monroe Doctrine, 1823 ; War in 1898 against Spain over Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines). The United States, in turn, will attempt to prevent peer dominance in Eurasia. They already try to block Russia from regaining control over Ukraine after 1991, and support Ukraine in its wish to be independent and join the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic space.
This dynamic produces structural tension independent of ideology.
The U.S.–China rivalry fits Mearsheimer’s model almost precisely:
- Trade integration (2001–2016) did not eliminate security competition.
- Military modernization accelerated on both sides.
- The U.S. “Pivot to Asia” (2011) reoriented force posture.
- China expanded naval capabilities, artificial island construction (2014–2016), and anti-access/area-denial systems.
- Taiwan became a focal flashpoint.
Mearsheimer warned in 2014 that great-power politics would return to Europe as NATO expanded eastward while Russia weakened and resented encroachment. The Ukraine war validated his broader structural claim: security dilemmas escalate when powers fear encirclement.
The tragedy lies not in malice, but in structural compulsion.
War in the Middle East since March 2026
The war involving Iran illustrates the integration of economic pressure with military escalation. Financial sanctions, payment system exclusion, and export controls by the U.S. and its allies now operate as components of a broader strategic toolkit. On the other side, Iran closed the Straits of Hormuz and has targeted the oil tankers trying to navigate through it, provoking an oil price crisis worldwide.
III. Declining Hegemonic Stability
The post-1945 international order rested on a specific structural condition: the preponderance of American power. The United States did not merely participate in the system—it organized it. The theory of hegemonic stability, articulated by Charles Kindleberger in The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (1973) and later refined by Robert Gilpin in War and Change in World Politics (1981), posits that international order depends on the presence of a dominant state willing and able to supply collective goods. These goods include an open trading system, a stable monetary framework, and security guarantees that reduce uncertainty among other states.
After 1945, the United States fulfilled these functions with unprecedented scope. Through the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—it stabilized the global financial system. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1947, progressively reduced trade barriers. The creation of NATO in 1949 institutionalized American security commitments in Europe, while bilateral alliances extended U.S. influence across Asia. The U.S. Navy ensured freedom of navigation along critical sea lanes, facilitating the expansion of global commerce. Simultaneously, containment of the Soviet Union structured the geopolitical order, creating a stable bipolar equilibrium.
This system persisted, with adaptations, after the Cold War. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States entered what Charles Krauthammer termed the “unipolar moment.” American primacy appeared uncontested. The dollar accounted for over 70% of global reserves in the early 2000s. NATO expanded eastward in 1999 and 2004. The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, incorporated China in 2001, accelerating globalization.
After 1945, the United States:
- Anchored the Bretton Woods system.
- Created NATO (1949).
- Established the dollar as reserve currency.
- Secured sea lanes.
- Contained Soviet expansion.
After 1991, American primacy continued, but cracks emerged:
- Relative Economic Decline
The U.S. share of global GDP gradually declined as Asia rose. - Costly Overextension
Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001–2021) drained political and financial capital. - Domestic Polarization
Internal fragmentation weakened strategic coherence. - Weaponization of Interdependence
Sanctions regimes expanded dramatically after 2014 and especially 2022, encouraging targeted states to build alternatives.
Yet hegemonic stability is not static. It depends on the continued capacity and willingness of the hegemon to sustain systemic leadership. By the 2010s, structural pressures began to erode this foundation.
When hegemony weakens, revisionist powers test boundaries.
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IV. The BRICS Factor and Systemic Realignment
The rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa; later expansion) symbolizes institutional balancing.
While BRICS is not a military alliance, it represents strategic dissatisfaction with Western institutional dominance. The creation of the New Development Bank (2014) and discussions of de-dollarization signal attempts to diversify systemic dependence.
Paul Jouvenet’s geopolitical analysis of BRICS argues that the bloc functions as a platform for coordinated strategic autonomy rather than ideological unity. It aims at reducing the Western leverage on the international stage by increasing alternative financing channels and diplomatic alignment among non-Western powers.
By 2030, the BRICS+ could together account for 40% of global GDP and about 45% of the population, with 3.5 billion people.
This is structural balancing in slow motion.
Multipolarity does not emerge solely through tanks and missiles. It emerges through:
- Payment systems.
- Energy trade diversification.
- Technology supply chain realignment.
- Institutional alternatives.
When financial architecture fragments, conflict probability increases because economic interdependence no longer constrains security escalation as strongly.
V. Why Multipolarity Is More Dangerous
Kenneth Waltz argued bipolar systems are stable because they generate :
- Fewer miscalculations.
- Clear alliance structures.
- Direct deterrence logic.
On the other side, multipolar systems (pre-1914 Europe) contain:
- Fluid alliances.
- Chain-ganging risks.
- Buck-passing behavior.
- Misperception cascades.
The pre-World War I order provides a cautionary analogy. Britain’s relative decline, Germany’s rise, Russian mobilization, alliance entanglements — structural instability culminated in 1914.
Today’s system shows comparable traits:
- U.S.–China rivalry.
- Russia–West confrontation.
- Regional nuclear actors (India–Pakistan).
- Middle Eastern proxy conflicts.
- Technological arms race in AI and cyber.
More poles mean more potential dyadic crises and more instability on the world stage.
VI. Nuclear Deterrence Is Not Enough
The proposition that nuclear weapons prevent great-power war has long structured strategic thinking. Since 1945, and particularly during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence contributed to the avoidance of direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD), formalized in the 1960s and analyzed by Thomas Schelling (Arms and Influence, 1966) and Bernard Brodie, imposed a ceiling on escalation. Crises such as Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962) demonstrated that, despite acute tensions, the existence of second-strike capabilities constrained decision-makers.
However, this stabilizing effect was contingent upon a specific structural configuration: bipolarity. Two principal actors, relatively symmetrical arsenals, and increasingly institutionalized arms control frameworks — including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, 1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), and later START I (1991) — reduced uncertainty and created a degree of predictability in strategic interaction.
The contemporary nuclear environment differs fundamentally. The system has evolved toward a multipolar nuclear configuration, characterized by a greater number of actors, asymmetrical capabilities, and the erosion of arms control regimes. This transformation introduces new pathways for miscalculation.
As of 2024, all major nuclear powers engaged in comprehensive modernization programs. Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons and intend to modernize their arsenals. The United States pursued the renewal of its triad — Columbia-class submarines, B-21 strategic bombers, and Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) systems. Russia advanced hypersonic delivery systems such as Avangard and Kinzhal, while maintaining a large arsenal estimated at approximately 5,800 warheads (SIPRI, 2024). China, historically a minimal deterrent power, accelerated its nuclear expansion. U.S. Department of Defense reports estimated that Beijing possessed more than 500 operational warheads in 2023, with projections exceeding 1,000 by 2030 (SIPRI, 2024 and 2025).
Simultaneously, regional nuclear dyads intensified their capabilities. India and Pakistan continued to expand fissile material production and diversify delivery systems, including sea-based deterrents. North Korea demonstrated rapid progress in missile technology, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) tested in 2017 and subsequent refinements through the early 2020s. Israel maintained strategic ambiguity while preserving credible deterrent capabilities.
This diversification of nuclear actors complicated deterrence logic. In a bipolar system, signaling and red lines were relatively clear. In a multipolar system, deterrence becomes fragmented and non-linear. Each dyadic relationship — U.S.–China, India–Pakistan, U.S.–Russia, China–India — operates according to distinct doctrines, threat perceptions, and escalation thresholds. Cross-theater interactions further increase complexity: a crisis in the Taiwan Strait may affect calculations in Eastern Europe or the Korean Peninsula.
Moreover, the erosion of arms control frameworks exacerbated instability. The U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the uncertain future of New START reduced transparency. As Robert Jervis argued, uncertainty in adversary capabilities and intentions heightens the risk of worst-case scenario planning, thereby accelerating arms races.
Technological developments introduced additional risks. Hypersonic weapons reduced warning times. Cyber capabilities threatened command-and-control systems. The integration of artificial intelligence into early-warning architectures raised concerns about automation bias and escalation through system error. As noted by scholars such as Vipin Narang (MIT) and Tong Zhao (Carnegie), these innovations compress decision timelines and increase the probability of inadvertent escalation.
Thus, while nuclear deterrence continues to impose a powerful constraint on deliberate large-scale war, it no longer guarantees systemic stability. The multiplication of actors, the asymmetry of capabilities, the decline of arms control, and the emergence of disruptive technologies collectively narrow the margins of safety.
Deterrence persists — but it operates in a more opaque, less predictable environment. The risk is no longer solely intentional escalation; it increasingly lies in misperception, miscalculation, and systemic complexity.
VII. The Security Dilemma Intensifies
The concept of the security dilemma, formalized by Robert Jervis in his seminal 1978 article “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” described a structural condition in which measures adopted by a state to increase its own security were perceived by others as threatening, thereby triggering countermeasures that ultimately reduced the security of all. This dynamic, already present during the Cold War, intensified significantly under contemporary multipolar conditions.
In a bipolar system, signaling remained comparatively clearer. The United States and the Soviet Union developed mechanisms — including arms control agreements, hotlines, and crisis management protocols — that mitigated misinterpretation. In contrast, a multipolar environment multiplied the number of actors, threat perceptions, and strategic cultures, thereby increasing ambiguity and the likelihood of misperception.
The post-Cold War expansion of NATO illustrated this mechanism. From the perspective of the United States and its European allies, enlargement in 1999 and 2004 aimed to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe by extending a security umbrella to post-communist states. However, Russian strategic thought — articulated by figures such as Yevgeny Primakov and later reflected in official doctrines (notably the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation) — interpreted this expansion as a gradual encirclement. This divergence in perception contributed directly to heightened tensions, culminating in the crises of 2014 and 2022.
A similar dynamic unfolded in the Indo-Pacific. China’s naval modernization, including the rapid expansion of its surface fleet and the development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, was framed in Beijing as a defensive effort to secure maritime approaches and protect sea lines of communication. Yet, in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, these developments were widely interpreted as indicative of expansionist intent, particularly in light of activities in the South China Sea between 2014 and 2016.
Missile defense further exemplified the dilemma. The United States presented its ballistic missile defense systems as protective measures against rogue-state threats, notably Iran and North Korea. However, Russia and China perceived these systems as potentially undermining second-strike capabilities, thereby destabilizing nuclear deterrence. This perception contributed to the development of countermeasures, including hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced penetration aids.
The cumulative effect of these interactions was a self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust. Defensive doctrines generated offensive interpretations; these interpretations justified countermeasures; countermeasures, in turn, reinforced initial fears. As Charles Glaser and other realist scholars have emphasized, even in the absence of aggressive intent, structural conditions can produce competitive outcomes.
In the current international system, characterized by technological acceleration, doctrinal opacity, and weakened arms control frameworks, the security dilemma operates with increased intensity. Mutual suspicion no longer remains confined to military domains but extends to cyber infrastructure, supply chains, and financial systems. The result is a generalized securitization of international relations, in which cooperation becomes more difficult and escalation risks grow correspondingly.
VIII. Economic Fragmentation and Strategic Autonomy
For much of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, globalization was widely understood as a stabilizing force. Deep economic interdependence increased the opportunity cost of conflict, reinforcing what liberal theorists—from Norman Angell in The Great Illusion (1910) to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in Power and Interdependence (1977)—described as the pacifying effects of trade and financial integration. The underlying assumption was straightforward: states embedded in dense networks of commerce would be less inclined to escalate geopolitical tensions into open conflict.
This assumption is now under strain.
Since the mid-2010s—and with clear acceleration after 2020—the global economy has entered a phase of selective fragmentation. This process does not represent a full reversal of globalization, but rather its strategic reconfiguration along geopolitical lines. States are not abandoning interdependence; they are reshaping it to reduce vulnerability and increase autonomy.
Several structural developments illustrate this shift.
First, the imposition of U.S. semiconductor export controls on China beginning in 2018 and significantly expanded in October 2022 marked a decisive turning point. These measures restricted China’s access to advanced chips, manufacturing equipment, and technical expertise. As Chris Miller argues in Chip War (2022), semiconductors are the “oil of the digital age,” making control over their production a central strategic objective. The United States, in coordination with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, effectively leveraged chokepoints in the global supply chain to constrain China’s technological development.
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China’s response has been equally significant. Massive state investment in domestic semiconductor capacity—through funds exceeding $100 billion—reflects a long-term strategy of technological self-reliance. This dynamic exemplifies what economists describe as “decoupling under pressure”: restrictions imposed by one side accelerate autonomy efforts by the other.
Second, supply-chain restructuring has become a defining feature of corporate and state strategy. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global production networks, particularly in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and critical minerals. Governments responded by promoting reshoring, nearshoring, and “friend-shoring.” The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act (2022) and the European Chips Act (2023) explicitly aim to localize production of critical technologies.
This shift reflects a broader redefinition of efficiency. For decades, firms optimized for cost minimization through global dispersion of production. Today, resilience and security are increasingly prioritized, even at the expense of higher costs. As the OECD has noted in recent reports (2023–2025), supply chains are becoming shorter, more regional, and more politically conditioned.
Third, energy markets have undergone profound realignment following the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Europe, historically dependent on Russian pipeline gas, rapidly diversified toward liquefied natural gas (LNG), particularly from the United States and Qatar. Russia, in turn, redirected energy exports toward China and India, often at discounted prices.
This reconfiguration illustrates how geopolitical shocks can permanently alter trade flows. Energy, long considered a global commodity market, is increasingly shaped by political alignment. Contracts, infrastructure, and pricing mechanisms now reflect strategic considerations as much as market dynamics.
The cumulative effect of these developments is the gradual emergence of strategic autonomy as a central objective of state policy. The European Union has explicitly adopted this concept in areas ranging from digital regulation to defense industrial policy. China’s “dual circulation” strategy similarly seeks to reduce external dependence while maintaining selective global engagement. The United States, while historically a champion of open markets, has increasingly embraced industrial policy and export controls as instruments of national security.
This transformation has significant implications for deterrence and conflict dynamics.
When economic interdependence is high, the costs of confrontation are immediate and widely distributed. Trade disruption, capital flight, and supply-chain breakdown impose rapid economic penalties on all parties involved. This creates what might be termed deterrent friction—a structural constraint on escalation.
However, as interdependence weakens or becomes more segmented, these constraints diminish. States that have diversified supply chains, localized production, or secured alternative markets are better positioned to absorb shocks. The perceived cost of confrontation declines, even if the absolute cost remains high.
Historical analogies reinforce this point. In the late nineteenth century, rising economic interdependence did not prevent the outbreak of World War I in 1914. As historians such as Christopher Clark (The Sleepwalkers, 2012) have shown, political and strategic calculations ultimately overrode economic and cultural considerations. The current period may reflect a similar dynamic: interdependence persists, but it is no longer sufficient to guarantee restraint of great powers.
Moreover, fragmentation introduces new forms of competition. Instead of a single global market, multiple partially overlapping systems are emerging:
- A U.S.-centered financial and technological network ;
- A China-centered industrial and trade ecosystem ;
- A heterogeneous Global South navigating between them ;
- Structuring economic and energy ties between Russia and China.
This multipolar economic structure increases complexity and reduces predictability. Firms must navigate divergent regulatory regimes, sanctions risks, and political pressures. Investors face greater uncertainty regarding long-term returns, particularly in sectors exposed to geopolitical competition.
From a strategic perspective, economic fragmentation does not eliminate interdependence—it redistributes it. Dependencies become more asymmetric, more politicized, and more contested. This, in turn, creates incentives for states to exploit economic leverage, whether through sanctions, export controls, or resource access.
The result is a paradox: globalization has not disappeared, but its stabilizing effects have weakened. Economic ties remain extensive, yet they are increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations.
In this environment, strategic autonomy becomes both a defensive necessity and a source of competitive advantage. States that successfully reduce critical dependencies—whether in energy, technology, or finance—enhance their freedom of action. Conversely, those that remain structurally dependent face heightened vulnerability.
Ultimately, the erosion of economic interdependence as a constraint on conflict represents one of the most significant structural shifts of the twenty-first century. It does not make conflict inevitable. But it reduces one of the key mechanisms that previously helped prevent it.
For analysts, policymakers, and investors alike, the implication is clear: economic structures can no longer be treated as neutral or purely efficiency-driven. They are increasingly embedded within geopolitical competition.
And as deterrent friction declines, the margin for miscalculation narrows.
IX. Why the System Is More Volatile Now Than in 1991
To understand why global risk feels qualitatively higher today, one must compare structural conditions.
In 1991, the international system displayed four stabilizing characteristics.
First, there was one dominant pole. The United States emerged from the Cold War with unmatched military, financial, technological, and ideological power. Its defense spending dwarfed any competitor. Its navy controlled global sea lanes. Its alliances spanned Europe and Asia. There was no near-peer competitor.
Second, potential challengers were weak. Russia experienced economic collapse throughout the 1990s, losing nearly 40% of its GDP between 1991 and 1998. China’s GDP was still a fraction of the U.S. economy; its military capabilities were regionally limited. India remained economically constrained. The European Union was deepening integration rather than projecting hard power.
Third, the liberal institutional order expanded. NATO enlarged in 1999 and 2004. The European Union expanded eastward. The World Trade Organization was established in 1995. China entered the WTO in 2001. Global trade as a percentage of world GDP increased significantly between 1990 and 2008. Interdependence created expectations of convergence.
Fourth, the system inherited nuclear bipolar stability. Although the Soviet Union dissolved, the nuclear logic of mutually assured destruction remained intact between Washington and Moscow. Arms control treaties such as START I (1991) and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum reinforced deterrence predictability. Nuclear risk existed, but the number of strategic decision centers remained limited.
By contrast, the mid-2020s system differs structurally in every dimension.
There are now multiple major powers with comparable capabilities. China has reached near parity with the United States in economic scale when measured by purchasing power parity. Its military modernization has been rapid, particularly in naval and missile forces. Russia, though economically weaker, demonstrated willingness to revise borders by force in 2008, 2014, and 2022. India’s economy is among the fastest-growing major economies and is translating demographic weight into geopolitical leverage.
Second, regional nuclear rivalries have intensified. India–Pakistan deterrence remains fragile. North Korea continues expanding its missile capabilities. China is increasing its nuclear arsenal, complicating the formerly bilateral U.S.–Russia strategic framework. Nuclear deterrence is no longer structured around a stable dyad.
Third, hegemonic authority has eroded. The United States remains the strongest actor but faces internal polarization and external resistance. Sanctions regimes have proliferated, but their effectiveness depends on broad compliance — which is weakening. The credibility of security guarantees is increasingly tested, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
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Fourth, financial system fragmentation is emerging. While the dollar remains dominant, discussions of alternative settlement mechanisms have increased. Energy trade patterns shifted dramatically after 2022. Strategic commodities are being securitized. Economic interdependence is no longer assumed to be permanent or benign.
Fifth, the system is witnessing a technological arms race across artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, space systems, and hypersonic weapons. Unlike previous arms competitions confined largely to military platforms, today’s competition spans civilian infrastructure, supply chains, and digital ecosystems. This expands the domain of contestation.
The cumulative result is clear: volatility is rising not because the world has become more ideological, but because power is redistributing across more actors simultaneously.
X. The Dangerous Decade Ahead
Power transition theory, articulated by A.F.K. Organski in 1958, argues that systemic war becomes most likely when a rising power approaches parity with the dominant state. Dissatisfaction combined with capability creates risk.
China is now approaching parity with the United States in economic magnitude, though not yet in global force projection capacity. The United States, for its part, seeks to maintain strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific while preserving alliance credibility in Europe and the Middle East. Russia, weakened economically but assertive militarily, seeks to revise European security arrangements. India rises but strategically hedges, maintaining relations with both Western and non-Western blocs.
This configuration produces transition instability. It resembles earlier historical moments when structural shifts outpaced institutional adaptation.
The 1890s saw Germany’s rapid industrial rise challenge British naval dominance. The 1930s witnessed revisionist powers exploit economic depression and institutional weakness. In both cases, the established order struggled to integrate rising actors while maintaining deterrence credibility.
The 2020s display similar characteristics: accelerating economic shifts, contested norms, military modernization, and declining institutional cohesion. Transition periods are not inevitably catastrophic — but they are structurally dangerous.
The coming decade will test whether great powers can manage rivalry without escalation. Taiwan, the Baltic region, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula represent potential flashpoints where local crises could entangle major powers.
XI. What Would Stabilize the System?
Historically, three configurations have produced relative stability.
First, clear bipolarity, as during the Cold War, simplified deterrence logic and alliance structures. Two poles reduced uncertainty and clarified red lines.
Second, hegemonic consolidation, as after 1945, allowed a dominant power to provide public goods and enforce systemic rules.
Third, institutionalized multipolar governance, such as the Concert of Europe (1815–1853), enabled great powers to coordinate crisis management despite ideological differences.
None of these conditions are fully present today.
The system is not clearly bipolar; it is not securely unipolar; and it lacks a cohesive multipolar concert. Elite trust among major powers is low. Normative fragmentation is high. Strategic communication channels exist but are strained.
A stable multipolar concert would require shared crisis-management mechanisms, predictable red lines, and elite consensus on basic order principles. Yet ideological divergence and domestic political polarization complicate such consensus-building.
The absence of a stabilizing structure increases systemic unpredictability.
XII. Conclusion: Structure, Not Accident
Global conflict risk is rising because the architecture of power is shifting.
Unipolarity is ending. Multipolarity is emerging. Hegemonic stability is weakening. Balancing behavior is accelerating. Economic fragmentation reduces constraints. Nuclear deterrence is becoming more complex in a multi-actor environment.
None of this guarantees global war. Structural tension does not equal inevitability.
However, history suggests that periods of power redistribution carry elevated risk. The late nineteenth century, the interwar period, and the early Cold War all reflected transitional instability.
The contemporary system is undergoing comparable structural transformation. Leaders operate within this evolving architecture. Their decisions matter — but they are constrained by systemic incentives.
The world is becoming more dangerous not primarily because leaders are irrational, but because the distribution of power is changing faster than institutions can adapt.
Structural transitions rarely unfold quietly. The next decade will determine whether this transition is managed — or whether instability intensifies into open confrontation.
Selected References
- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979)
- John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
- Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (1973)
- Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981)
- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” (1978)
- Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules (2012)
- Paul Jouvenet, analyses on BRICS and multipolar order (2022 and 2023)
- SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2024)
- IMF World Economic Outlook (various years)
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© Copyright 2026 – Eurasia Business News. Article no. 2075
Eurasia Business News, April 1st, 2026. Article no. 2076
Why the World Is Becoming More Dangerous — Structural Causes
For three decades after 1991, much of the strategic community assumed that major war among great powers had become improbable. The Cold War had ended without nuclear exchange. The United States emerged as the sole superpower. Globalization accelerated. Institutions expanded. The European Union deepened. China integrated into the world economy after joining the WTO in 2001.
Yet as of the mid-2020s, global conflict risk is measurably rising. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered the European security order. Strategic competition between the United States and China intensified across the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The Middle East witnessed renewed regional escalation cycles. Military budgets surged worldwide — reaching over $2.4 trillion globally in 2023 (SIPRI, 2024). Nuclear modernization programs accelerated in all major nuclear powers.
The outbreak of a new war involving Iran in March 2026 further underscores this trend. Triggered by escalating confrontations between Iran and regional adversaries—particularly Israel—and involving indirect U.S. military engagement, the conflict has rapidly expanded beyond proxy dynamics into direct interstate confrontation. Strikes on strategic infrastructure, maritime disruptions in the Persian Gulf, and heightened risks around the Strait of Hormuz have introduced significant volatility into global energy markets. More importantly, the conflict illustrates how regional rivalries are increasingly embedded within broader great-power competition, with external actors providing diplomatic, logistical, or military support. The Middle East, long characterized by proxy warfare, is thus re-emerging as a theater of direct strategic confrontation with global implications.
Why is this happening?
The answer is structural. The international system is moving from unipolarity toward unstable multipolarity, while hegemonic stability is eroding. This systemic transition — long predicted by structural realist theory — historically correlates with rising probability of great-power confrontation.
This is not about personalities. It is about distribution of power.
I. From Unipolar Moment to Multipolar Tension
In 1990, U.S. GDP represented roughly 25% of global output. Its military spending exceeded that of the next ten countries combined. NATO expanded eastward in Europe in 1999 and 2004. The dollar dominated global reserves (over 70% in 2000). No peer competitor existed.
Charles Krauthammer famously called this period the “Unipolar Moment” (Foreign Affairs, 1990). Structural realists debated how long it would last.
According to Kenneth Waltz (Theory of International Politics, 1979), international systems are defined by polarity — the number of great powers capable of shaping outcomes. Waltz argued that bipolar systems (like the Cold War) tend to be more stable because fewer actors reduce miscalculation. Multipolar systems, by contrast, increase uncertainty, alliance fluidity, and misperception.
From 1947 to 1991, the U.S.–Soviet bipolar structure produced intense rivalry but avoided direct great-power war. After 1991, the system became unipolar — historically rare. Unipolarity often tempts the dominant power to expand its commitments, while rising powers accumulate grievances.
By the 2010s, the structural distribution of power shifted. China’s GDP (PPP) surpassed that of the United States around 2014 (IMF estimates). Russia reasserted military capacity, demonstrated in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022). India’s economic weight increased dramatically. Regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia pursued autonomous strategies.
The system began tilting toward multipolarity.
Waltz predicted that balancing behavior would eventually emerge against a unipolar hegemon. That balancing is now visible — not only militarily but financially, technologically, and diplomatically.
II. John Mearsheimer and the Logic of Offensive Realism
If Waltz explains systemic structure, John Mearsheimer explains behavior within it.
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), Mearsheimer argued that great powers are compelled to maximize relative power because the international system lacks central authority. Security competition is not optional; it is built into anarchy. States must be ready to strike first when danger lurks.
From this perspective, China’s rise inevitably generates U.S. containment efforts. A rising China will seek regional hegemony in Asia, just as the United States achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century (Monroe Doctrine, 1823 ; War in 1898 against Spain over Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines). The United States, in turn, will attempt to prevent peer dominance in Eurasia. They already try to block Russia from regaining control over Ukraine after 1991, and support Ukraine in its wish to be independent and join the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic space.
This dynamic produces structural tension independent of ideology.
The U.S.–China rivalry fits Mearsheimer’s model almost precisely:
- Trade integration (2001–2016) did not eliminate security competition.
- Military modernization accelerated on both sides.
- The U.S. “Pivot to Asia” (2011) reoriented force posture.
- China expanded naval capabilities, artificial island construction (2014–2016), and anti-access/area-denial systems.
- Taiwan became a focal flashpoint.
Mearsheimer warned in 2014 that great-power politics would return to Europe as NATO expanded eastward while Russia weakened and resented encroachment. The Ukraine war validated his broader structural claim: security dilemmas escalate when powers fear encirclement.
The tragedy lies not in malice, but in structural compulsion.
War in the Middle East since March 2026
The war involving Iran illustrates the integration of economic pressure with military escalation. Financial sanctions, payment system exclusion, and export controls by the U.S. and its allies now operate as components of a broader strategic toolkit. On the other side, Iran closed the Straits of Hormuz and has targeted the oil tankers trying to navigate through it, provoking an oil price crisis worldwide.
III. Declining Hegemonic Stability
The post-1945 international order rested on a specific structural condition: the preponderance of American power. The United States did not merely participate in the system—it organized it. The theory of hegemonic stability, articulated by Charles Kindleberger in The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (1973) and later refined by Robert Gilpin in War and Change in World Politics (1981), posits that international order depends on the presence of a dominant state willing and able to supply collective goods. These goods include an open trading system, a stable monetary framework, and security guarantees that reduce uncertainty among other states.
After 1945, the United States fulfilled these functions with unprecedented scope. Through the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—it stabilized the global financial system. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in 1947, progressively reduced trade barriers. The creation of NATO in 1949 institutionalized American security commitments in Europe, while bilateral alliances extended U.S. influence across Asia. The U.S. Navy ensured freedom of navigation along critical sea lanes, facilitating the expansion of global commerce. Simultaneously, containment of the Soviet Union structured the geopolitical order, creating a stable bipolar equilibrium.
This system persisted, with adaptations, after the Cold War. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States entered what Charles Krauthammer termed the “unipolar moment.” American primacy appeared uncontested. The dollar accounted for over 70% of global reserves in the early 2000s. NATO expanded eastward in 1999 and 2004. The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, incorporated China in 2001, accelerating globalization.
After 1945, the United States:
- Anchored the Bretton Woods system.
- Created NATO (1949).
- Established the dollar as reserve currency.
- Secured sea lanes.
- Contained Soviet expansion.
After 1991, American primacy continued, but cracks emerged:
- Relative Economic Decline
The U.S. share of global GDP gradually declined as Asia rose. - Costly Overextension
Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001–2021) drained political and financial capital. - Domestic Polarization
Internal fragmentation weakened strategic coherence. - Weaponization of Interdependence
Sanctions regimes expanded dramatically after 2014 and especially 2022, encouraging targeted states to build alternatives.
Yet hegemonic stability is not static. It depends on the continued capacity and willingness of the hegemon to sustain systemic leadership. By the 2010s, structural pressures began to erode this foundation.
When hegemony weakens, revisionist powers test boundaries.
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IV. The BRICS Factor and Systemic Realignment
The rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa; later expansion) symbolizes institutional balancing.
While BRICS is not a military alliance, it represents strategic dissatisfaction with Western institutional dominance. The creation of the New Development Bank (2014) and discussions of de-dollarization signal attempts to diversify systemic dependence.
Paul Jouvenet’s geopolitical analysis of BRICS argues that the bloc functions as a platform for coordinated strategic autonomy rather than ideological unity. It aims at reducing the Western leverage on the international stage by increasing alternative financing channels and diplomatic alignment among non-Western powers.
By 2030, the BRICS+ could together account for 40% of global GDP and about 45% of the population, with 3.5 billion people.
This is structural balancing in slow motion.
Multipolarity does not emerge solely through tanks and missiles. It emerges through:
- Payment systems.
- Energy trade diversification.
- Technology supply chain realignment.
- Institutional alternatives.
When financial architecture fragments, conflict probability increases because economic interdependence no longer constrains security escalation as strongly.
V. Why Multipolarity Is More Dangerous
Kenneth Waltz argued bipolar systems are stable because they generate :
- Fewer miscalculations.
- Clear alliance structures.
- Direct deterrence logic.
On the other side, multipolar systems (pre-1914 Europe) contain:
- Fluid alliances.
- Chain-ganging risks.
- Buck-passing behavior.
- Misperception cascades.
The pre-World War I order provides a cautionary analogy. Britain’s relative decline, Germany’s rise, Russian mobilization, alliance entanglements — structural instability culminated in 1914.
Today’s system shows comparable traits:
- U.S.–China rivalry.
- Russia–West confrontation.
- Regional nuclear actors (India–Pakistan).
- Middle Eastern proxy conflicts.
- Technological arms race in AI and cyber.
More poles mean more potential dyadic crises and more instability on the world stage.
VI. Nuclear Deterrence Is Not Enough
The proposition that nuclear weapons prevent great-power war has long structured strategic thinking. Since 1945, and particularly during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence contributed to the avoidance of direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD), formalized in the 1960s and analyzed by Thomas Schelling (Arms and Influence, 1966) and Bernard Brodie, imposed a ceiling on escalation. Crises such as Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962) demonstrated that, despite acute tensions, the existence of second-strike capabilities constrained decision-makers.
However, this stabilizing effect was contingent upon a specific structural configuration: bipolarity. Two principal actors, relatively symmetrical arsenals, and increasingly institutionalized arms control frameworks — including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I, 1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), and later START I (1991) — reduced uncertainty and created a degree of predictability in strategic interaction.
The contemporary nuclear environment differs fundamentally. The system has evolved toward a multipolar nuclear configuration, characterized by a greater number of actors, asymmetrical capabilities, and the erosion of arms control regimes. This transformation introduces new pathways for miscalculation.
As of 2024, all major nuclear powers engaged in comprehensive modernization programs. Russia and the USA together possess almost 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons and intend to modernize their arsenals. The United States pursued the renewal of its triad — Columbia-class submarines, B-21 strategic bombers, and Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) systems. Russia advanced hypersonic delivery systems such as Avangard and Kinzhal, while maintaining a large arsenal estimated at approximately 5,800 warheads (SIPRI, 2024). China, historically a minimal deterrent power, accelerated its nuclear expansion. U.S. Department of Defense reports estimated that Beijing possessed more than 500 operational warheads in 2023, with projections exceeding 1,000 by 2030 (SIPRI, 2024 and 2025).
Simultaneously, regional nuclear dyads intensified their capabilities. India and Pakistan continued to expand fissile material production and diversify delivery systems, including sea-based deterrents. North Korea demonstrated rapid progress in missile technology, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) tested in 2017 and subsequent refinements through the early 2020s. Israel maintained strategic ambiguity while preserving credible deterrent capabilities.
This diversification of nuclear actors complicated deterrence logic. In a bipolar system, signaling and red lines were relatively clear. In a multipolar system, deterrence becomes fragmented and non-linear. Each dyadic relationship — U.S.–China, India–Pakistan, U.S.–Russia, China–India — operates according to distinct doctrines, threat perceptions, and escalation thresholds. Cross-theater interactions further increase complexity: a crisis in the Taiwan Strait may affect calculations in Eastern Europe or the Korean Peninsula.
Moreover, the erosion of arms control frameworks exacerbated instability. The U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 and the uncertain future of New START reduced transparency. As Robert Jervis argued, uncertainty in adversary capabilities and intentions heightens the risk of worst-case scenario planning, thereby accelerating arms races.
Technological developments introduced additional risks. Hypersonic weapons reduced warning times. Cyber capabilities threatened command-and-control systems. The integration of artificial intelligence into early-warning architectures raised concerns about automation bias and escalation through system error. As noted by scholars such as Vipin Narang (MIT) and Tong Zhao (Carnegie), these innovations compress decision timelines and increase the probability of inadvertent escalation.
Thus, while nuclear deterrence continues to impose a powerful constraint on deliberate large-scale war, it no longer guarantees systemic stability. The multiplication of actors, the asymmetry of capabilities, the decline of arms control, and the emergence of disruptive technologies collectively narrow the margins of safety.
Deterrence persists — but it operates in a more opaque, less predictable environment. The risk is no longer solely intentional escalation; it increasingly lies in misperception, miscalculation, and systemic complexity.
VII. The Security Dilemma Intensifies
The concept of the security dilemma, formalized by Robert Jervis in his seminal 1978 article “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” described a structural condition in which measures adopted by a state to increase its own security were perceived by others as threatening, thereby triggering countermeasures that ultimately reduced the security of all. This dynamic, already present during the Cold War, intensified significantly under contemporary multipolar conditions.
In a bipolar system, signaling remained comparatively clearer. The United States and the Soviet Union developed mechanisms — including arms control agreements, hotlines, and crisis management protocols — that mitigated misinterpretation. In contrast, a multipolar environment multiplied the number of actors, threat perceptions, and strategic cultures, thereby increasing ambiguity and the likelihood of misperception.
The post-Cold War expansion of NATO illustrated this mechanism. From the perspective of the United States and its European allies, enlargement in 1999 and 2004 aimed to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe by extending a security umbrella to post-communist states. However, Russian strategic thought — articulated by figures such as Yevgeny Primakov and later reflected in official doctrines (notably the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation) — interpreted this expansion as a gradual encirclement. This divergence in perception contributed directly to heightened tensions, culminating in the crises of 2014 and 2022.
A similar dynamic unfolded in the Indo-Pacific. China’s naval modernization, including the rapid expansion of its surface fleet and the development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, was framed in Beijing as a defensive effort to secure maritime approaches and protect sea lines of communication. Yet, in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, these developments were widely interpreted as indicative of expansionist intent, particularly in light of activities in the South China Sea between 2014 and 2016.
Missile defense further exemplified the dilemma. The United States presented its ballistic missile defense systems as protective measures against rogue-state threats, notably Iran and North Korea. However, Russia and China perceived these systems as potentially undermining second-strike capabilities, thereby destabilizing nuclear deterrence. This perception contributed to the development of countermeasures, including hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced penetration aids.
The cumulative effect of these interactions was a self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust. Defensive doctrines generated offensive interpretations; these interpretations justified countermeasures; countermeasures, in turn, reinforced initial fears. As Charles Glaser and other realist scholars have emphasized, even in the absence of aggressive intent, structural conditions can produce competitive outcomes.
In the current international system, characterized by technological acceleration, doctrinal opacity, and weakened arms control frameworks, the security dilemma operates with increased intensity. Mutual suspicion no longer remains confined to military domains but extends to cyber infrastructure, supply chains, and financial systems. The result is a generalized securitization of international relations, in which cooperation becomes more difficult and escalation risks grow correspondingly.
VIII. Economic Fragmentation and Strategic Autonomy
For much of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, globalization was widely understood as a stabilizing force. Deep economic interdependence increased the opportunity cost of conflict, reinforcing what liberal theorists—from Norman Angell in The Great Illusion (1910) to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in Power and Interdependence (1977)—described as the pacifying effects of trade and financial integration. The underlying assumption was straightforward: states embedded in dense networks of commerce would be less inclined to escalate geopolitical tensions into open conflict.
This assumption is now under strain.
Since the mid-2010s—and with clear acceleration after 2020—the global economy has entered a phase of selective fragmentation. This process does not represent a full reversal of globalization, but rather its strategic reconfiguration along geopolitical lines. States are not abandoning interdependence; they are reshaping it to reduce vulnerability and increase autonomy.
Several structural developments illustrate this shift.
First, the imposition of U.S. semiconductor export controls on China beginning in 2018 and significantly expanded in October 2022 marked a decisive turning point. These measures restricted China’s access to advanced chips, manufacturing equipment, and technical expertise. As Chris Miller argues in Chip War (2022), semiconductors are the “oil of the digital age,” making control over their production a central strategic objective. The United States, in coordination with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, effectively leveraged chokepoints in the global supply chain to constrain China’s technological development.
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China’s response has been equally significant. Massive state investment in domestic semiconductor capacity—through funds exceeding $100 billion—reflects a long-term strategy of technological self-reliance. This dynamic exemplifies what economists describe as “decoupling under pressure”: restrictions imposed by one side accelerate autonomy efforts by the other.
Second, supply-chain restructuring has become a defining feature of corporate and state strategy. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in global production networks, particularly in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and critical minerals. Governments responded by promoting reshoring, nearshoring, and “friend-shoring.” The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act (2022) and the European Chips Act (2023) explicitly aim to localize production of critical technologies.
This shift reflects a broader redefinition of efficiency. For decades, firms optimized for cost minimization through global dispersion of production. Today, resilience and security are increasingly prioritized, even at the expense of higher costs. As the OECD has noted in recent reports (2023–2025), supply chains are becoming shorter, more regional, and more politically conditioned.
Third, energy markets have undergone profound realignment following the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Europe, historically dependent on Russian pipeline gas, rapidly diversified toward liquefied natural gas (LNG), particularly from the United States and Qatar. Russia, in turn, redirected energy exports toward China and India, often at discounted prices.
This reconfiguration illustrates how geopolitical shocks can permanently alter trade flows. Energy, long considered a global commodity market, is increasingly shaped by political alignment. Contracts, infrastructure, and pricing mechanisms now reflect strategic considerations as much as market dynamics.
The cumulative effect of these developments is the gradual emergence of strategic autonomy as a central objective of state policy. The European Union has explicitly adopted this concept in areas ranging from digital regulation to defense industrial policy. China’s “dual circulation” strategy similarly seeks to reduce external dependence while maintaining selective global engagement. The United States, while historically a champion of open markets, has increasingly embraced industrial policy and export controls as instruments of national security.
This transformation has significant implications for deterrence and conflict dynamics.
When economic interdependence is high, the costs of confrontation are immediate and widely distributed. Trade disruption, capital flight, and supply-chain breakdown impose rapid economic penalties on all parties involved. This creates what might be termed deterrent friction—a structural constraint on escalation.
However, as interdependence weakens or becomes more segmented, these constraints diminish. States that have diversified supply chains, localized production, or secured alternative markets are better positioned to absorb shocks. The perceived cost of confrontation declines, even if the absolute cost remains high.
Historical analogies reinforce this point. In the late nineteenth century, rising economic interdependence did not prevent the outbreak of World War I in 1914. As historians such as Christopher Clark (The Sleepwalkers, 2012) have shown, political and strategic calculations ultimately overrode economic and cultural considerations. The current period may reflect a similar dynamic: interdependence persists, but it is no longer sufficient to guarantee restraint of great powers.
Moreover, fragmentation introduces new forms of competition. Instead of a single global market, multiple partially overlapping systems are emerging:
- A U.S.-centered financial and technological network ;
- A China-centered industrial and trade ecosystem ;
- A heterogeneous Global South navigating between them ;
- Structuring economic and energy ties between Russia and China.
This multipolar economic structure increases complexity and reduces predictability. Firms must navigate divergent regulatory regimes, sanctions risks, and political pressures. Investors face greater uncertainty regarding long-term returns, particularly in sectors exposed to geopolitical competition.
From a strategic perspective, economic fragmentation does not eliminate interdependence—it redistributes it. Dependencies become more asymmetric, more politicized, and more contested. This, in turn, creates incentives for states to exploit economic leverage, whether through sanctions, export controls, or resource access.
The result is a paradox: globalization has not disappeared, but its stabilizing effects have weakened. Economic ties remain extensive, yet they are increasingly subordinated to strategic considerations.
In this environment, strategic autonomy becomes both a defensive necessity and a source of competitive advantage. States that successfully reduce critical dependencies—whether in energy, technology, or finance—enhance their freedom of action. Conversely, those that remain structurally dependent face heightened vulnerability.
Ultimately, the erosion of economic interdependence as a constraint on conflict represents one of the most significant structural shifts of the twenty-first century. It does not make conflict inevitable. But it reduces one of the key mechanisms that previously helped prevent it.
For analysts, policymakers, and investors alike, the implication is clear: economic structures can no longer be treated as neutral or purely efficiency-driven. They are increasingly embedded within geopolitical competition.
And as deterrent friction declines, the margin for miscalculation narrows.
IX. Why the System Is More Volatile Now Than in 1991
To understand why global risk feels qualitatively higher today, one must compare structural conditions.
In 1991, the international system displayed four stabilizing characteristics.
First, there was one dominant pole. The United States emerged from the Cold War with unmatched military, financial, technological, and ideological power. Its defense spending dwarfed any competitor. Its navy controlled global sea lanes. Its alliances spanned Europe and Asia. There was no near-peer competitor.
Second, potential challengers were weak. Russia experienced economic collapse throughout the 1990s, losing nearly 40% of its GDP between 1991 and 1998. China’s GDP was still a fraction of the U.S. economy; its military capabilities were regionally limited. India remained economically constrained. The European Union was deepening integration rather than projecting hard power.
Third, the liberal institutional order expanded. NATO enlarged in 1999 and 2004. The European Union expanded eastward. The World Trade Organization was established in 1995. China entered the WTO in 2001. Global trade as a percentage of world GDP increased significantly between 1990 and 2008. Interdependence created expectations of convergence.
Fourth, the system inherited nuclear bipolar stability. Although the Soviet Union dissolved, the nuclear logic of mutually assured destruction remained intact between Washington and Moscow. Arms control treaties such as START I (1991) and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum reinforced deterrence predictability. Nuclear risk existed, but the number of strategic decision centers remained limited.
By contrast, the mid-2020s system differs structurally in every dimension.
There are now multiple major powers with comparable capabilities. China has reached near parity with the United States in economic scale when measured by purchasing power parity. Its military modernization has been rapid, particularly in naval and missile forces. Russia, though economically weaker, demonstrated willingness to revise borders by force in 2008, 2014, and 2022. India’s economy is among the fastest-growing major economies and is translating demographic weight into geopolitical leverage.
Second, regional nuclear rivalries have intensified. India–Pakistan deterrence remains fragile. North Korea continues expanding its missile capabilities. China is increasing its nuclear arsenal, complicating the formerly bilateral U.S.–Russia strategic framework. Nuclear deterrence is no longer structured around a stable dyad.
Third, hegemonic authority has eroded. The United States remains the strongest actor but faces internal polarization and external resistance. Sanctions regimes have proliferated, but their effectiveness depends on broad compliance — which is weakening. The credibility of security guarantees is increasingly tested, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
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Fourth, financial system fragmentation is emerging. While the dollar remains dominant, discussions of alternative settlement mechanisms have increased. Energy trade patterns shifted dramatically after 2022. Strategic commodities are being securitized. Economic interdependence is no longer assumed to be permanent or benign.
Fifth, the system is witnessing a technological arms race across artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, space systems, and hypersonic weapons. Unlike previous arms competitions confined largely to military platforms, today’s competition spans civilian infrastructure, supply chains, and digital ecosystems. This expands the domain of contestation.
The cumulative result is clear: volatility is rising not because the world has become more ideological, but because power is redistributing across more actors simultaneously.
X. The Dangerous Decade Ahead
Power transition theory, articulated by A.F.K. Organski in 1958, argues that systemic war becomes most likely when a rising power approaches parity with the dominant state. Dissatisfaction combined with capability creates risk.
China is now approaching parity with the United States in economic magnitude, though not yet in global force projection capacity. The United States, for its part, seeks to maintain strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific while preserving alliance credibility in Europe and the Middle East. Russia, weakened economically but assertive militarily, seeks to revise European security arrangements. India rises but strategically hedges, maintaining relations with both Western and non-Western blocs.
This configuration produces transition instability. It resembles earlier historical moments when structural shifts outpaced institutional adaptation.
The 1890s saw Germany’s rapid industrial rise challenge British naval dominance. The 1930s witnessed revisionist powers exploit economic depression and institutional weakness. In both cases, the established order struggled to integrate rising actors while maintaining deterrence credibility.
The 2020s display similar characteristics: accelerating economic shifts, contested norms, military modernization, and declining institutional cohesion. Transition periods are not inevitably catastrophic — but they are structurally dangerous.
The coming decade will test whether great powers can manage rivalry without escalation. Taiwan, the Baltic region, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula represent potential flashpoints where local crises could entangle major powers.
XI. What Would Stabilize the System?
Historically, three configurations have produced relative stability.
First, clear bipolarity, as during the Cold War, simplified deterrence logic and alliance structures. Two poles reduced uncertainty and clarified red lines.
Second, hegemonic consolidation, as after 1945, allowed a dominant power to provide public goods and enforce systemic rules.
Third, institutionalized multipolar governance, such as the Concert of Europe (1815–1853), enabled great powers to coordinate crisis management despite ideological differences.
None of these conditions are fully present today.
The system is not clearly bipolar; it is not securely unipolar; and it lacks a cohesive multipolar concert. Elite trust among major powers is low. Normative fragmentation is high. Strategic communication channels exist but are strained.
A stable multipolar concert would require shared crisis-management mechanisms, predictable red lines, and elite consensus on basic order principles. Yet ideological divergence and domestic political polarization complicate such consensus-building.
The absence of a stabilizing structure increases systemic unpredictability.
XII. Conclusion: Structure, Not Accident
Global conflict risk is rising because the architecture of power is shifting.
Unipolarity is ending. Multipolarity is emerging. Hegemonic stability is weakening. Balancing behavior is accelerating. Economic fragmentation reduces constraints. Nuclear deterrence is becoming more complex in a multi-actor environment.
None of this guarantees global war. Structural tension does not equal inevitability.
However, history suggests that periods of power redistribution carry elevated risk. The late nineteenth century, the interwar period, and the early Cold War all reflected transitional instability.
The contemporary system is undergoing comparable structural transformation. Leaders operate within this evolving architecture. Their decisions matter — but they are constrained by systemic incentives.
The world is becoming more dangerous not primarily because leaders are irrational, but because the distribution of power is changing faster than institutions can adapt.
Structural transitions rarely unfold quietly. The next decade will determine whether this transition is managed — or whether instability intensifies into open confrontation.
Selected References
- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979)
- John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
- Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (1973)
- Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981)
- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” (1978)
- Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules (2012)
- Paul Jouvenet, analyses on BRICS and multipolar order (2022 and 2023)
- SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2024)
- IMF World Economic Outlook (various years)
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© Copyright 2026 – Eurasia Business News. Article no. 2075
Eurasia Business News 